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Abstract
The political factors shaping IMF lending to developing countries have attracted at-
tention in recent empirical work. This goes in particular for the role and inuence
of the US. However, scant formal modelling makes interpretation of empirical results
di¢ cult. In this paper, we propose a model in which the US acts as principal within
the IMF and seeks to maximize its impact on the policy stance of debtor countries. We
derive an optimal loan allocation mechanism, which leads to the testable hypothesis
that the probability of an IMF loan is increasing in the amount of political concessions
countries make. A political concession is dened as the distance between a countrys
bliss point and its actual policy stance measured relative to the US. We introduce a
bliss-point proxy and demonstrate that our hypothesis is strongly supported in the
data. Moreover, we show that not accounting for bliss points may lead to endogeneity
bias in empirical work.
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1 Introduction
Countries in need of an arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund)
typically approach the Fund once alternative ways of nancing balance-of-payments decits
are no longer available. The need of borrower countries for Fund arrangements is therefore
likely to respond to a variety of economic factors (Knight and Santaella, 1997; Goldstein and
Montiel, 1986; Bird, 1995 & 1996). On the other hand, the granting of IMF loans depends
on Fund willingness to approve an arrangement on the basis of the economic stabilization
program put forward. Hence, IMF lending is, as demonstrated by Knight and Santaella
(1997), a joint outcome of economic demand and supply factors.
Moving beyond the economic determinants of IMF lending, claims have over the years
been made based on anecdotal evidence that political factors play a critical role in determin-
ing whether countries are successful in obtaining IMF loans or not; and the particular role
and inuence of the US on IMF behavior has attracted much attention. Calomiris (2000)
provides two interesting recent examples:1
Ecuador has been su¤ering a deepening scal crisis for several years caused
by the combination of an unresolved internal policy struggle, adverse economic
shocks to its terms of trade, and a poorly regulated banking system [. . . ]. As yet,
there is no consensus for reform in Ecuador, and there is no reason to believe
that reforms will be produced by a few hundreds of millions of IMF dollars. Why
in the world is the IMF sending money to Ecuador? Some observes claim that
IMF aid to Ecuador is best understood as a means of sending political payola to
the Ecuadorian government at a time when the United States wishes to ensure
continuing use of its military bases there monitoring drug tra¢ c.(p. 88).
1See Killick (1995) for earlier case-study based evidence.
2
A knowledgeable insider informs me that the U.S. government has told Pak-
istan that its access to IMF subsidized lending depends on its willingness to sign a
nuclear nonproliferation treaty. According to this person, unless Pakistan agrees,
the U.S. will block its IMF program.(p. 99).
Moreover, the Meltzer Commission (2000) implicitly accepts the view that G7 govern-
ments, particularly the US, use the IMF as a vehicle to achieve own political ends (see also
Bird and Rowlands, 2001). This is feasible since voting power in the IMF Executive Board
is based on the size of the quotas of member countries. The US holds around 17% of the
votes, and this in e¤ect gives the US veto power over all decisions requiring so-called special
voting majority (85%). In addition, the US Executive Director is appointed by the American
Government and is obliged by law to clear his or her decisions with the US Secretary of the
Treasury (Oatley and Yackee, 2000).
Econometric studies of the role of political factors in the decision making of the IMF
have also started to emerge. Examples include Thacker (1999), Bird and Rowlands (2001)
and Barro and Lee (2002). The common characteristic of these papers is that they specify
empirical models based on a long list of potential explanatory variables, and they all con-
clude that political and institutional factors, including US inuence, matter and add to our
understanding of Fund lending.2 However, none of the papers provide any formal theoretical
model of the rationale governing the allocation of IMF loans.3
Consider the seminal and widely quoted paper by Thacker (1999). He hypothesizes that
IMF lending is inuenced by political proximitybetween the potential borrower and the
US on key political matters, as well as by political movement towards the US policy
2Dreher and Jensen (2004) analyze whether political relations with the US have any bearing on IMF
conditionality. Interestingly, they nd that a debtor countrys relationship with the US inuences the number
of conditions the IMF imposes on a the country.
3Bird and Rowlands (2003), for example, call for a better understanding of precisely what the political
economy variables are, and the modalities through which the exert their inuence.
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position in these matters.4 Proximity is found to be statistically signicant, but only at the
10% level.5 In contrast, movement is signicant at the 1% level. Thacker concludes that
potential borrower countries are rewarded if they move closer to the US political position
regardless of absolute alignment. Yet, the lack of a formal theoretical underpinning makes
Thackers results di¢ cult to interpret: Why should the US reward a country taking a position
close to the US stance if that particular country would have done so regardless of any reward?
In the stylized model put forward in this paper, the empirical implications of the US
maximizing its overall inuence on the policy stance of IMF member countries are derived.6
The IMF loan allocation problem is posed as a mechanism design problem. We solve for
an optimal mechanism in which the US allocates IMF loans through an all-pay auction-
type mechanism, where loan allocation probabilities are increasing in the size of political
concessions. Political concessions are dened as the di¤erence between a countrys actual
policy position and its true political preferences, both measured relative to the US position.7
True political preferences are identied as bliss points in a policy space ranging from no to
complete alignment with the US. Actual positions are measured in the same policy space.
Our theoretical framework suggests that neglecting bliss points can lead to endogeneity
problems. This is potentially important since all previous studies to our knowledge neglect
bliss points. Relying on some measure of proximity on important issues, not the di¤erence
between proximity and bliss points, is problematic, since theoretically these two variables
are correlated; any a priory consistent empirical test must either construct a proxy variable
for the bliss points or rely on a xed-e¤ects approach to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity.
4Political proximity is captured by a variable constructed from data on voting in the United Nations
General Assembly, and movement is calculated as the change in this variable.
5This nding is echoed by Barro and Lee (2002) and Oatley and Yackey (2000). However, by using a
di¤erent measure of proximity than Thacker (1999), the interpretation is di¤erent. We will return to this
point in Section 3.
6Some argue that the interests of private nancial institutions (especially US nancial institutions) also
inuence the decisions of the IMF (see Gould, 2003 and Oatley and Yackee, 2000). While concurring with
the main trust of this argument, we do not pursue this type of inuence here.
7True political preferences are taken as a primitive datum.
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Opting for the former approach, we introduce an empirical proxy for the bliss points and
test our model using Thackers baseline empirical specication. Our hypothesis nds strong
support in both the Thacker data (1985-1994) and in an extended dataset covering 1995-
2000. In sum, both our theoretical model and the empirical results indicate that bliss points
should be taken into account. Moreover, by demonstrating that the data are consistent with
maximizing behavior, our paper strengthens the thesis that political factors play a decisive
role in IMF lending decisions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the model and solves for
the optimal mechanism. In Section 3, we derive empirical implications and test the model.
Conclusions are o¤ered in Section 4.
2 The Model
2.1 The set-up
Suppose that N countries from the set N = f1; ::; Ng are competing for the allocation of
an IMF loan, and assume that the US plays the role of principal within the IMF.8 Further,
assume that the US designs a loan allocation mechanism, which maximizes the degree of
alignment with its position on key foreign policy issues. Let bi 2 [0; 1] be the true preferences
of country i relative to the US (country is bliss point), with the US bliss point equal to 1.
Also, let the bis be publicly observable. A given country can take a position pi 2 [0; 1],
where pi = 1 indicates complete alignment with the US. Let ti = pi   bi be the political
concession (henceforth political payment) country i can o¤er in exchange for a loan allocation
probability. The total amount of political payments achieved by the US therefore equalsPN
i=1 ti:
8At rst glance, the assumption of just one loan seems restrictive since in reality the IMF allocates several
loans. One way to rationalize this is to think of a situation where all but one loan are allocated according
to economic criteria, and then the last loan is allocated by US discretion.
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Fig. 1 illustrates the setup. The maximum political payment country i can o¤er is given
by wi = 1  bi: Countries therefore face a constraint on their political payments. The closer
country is true preferences are to the US position, the less there is to o¤er and pay in terms
of political concessions.
USib ip
i i it p b= -
1i iw b= -
Fig. 1. The policy space
Turning to the specication of country utility, assume that all countries are risk neutral
with expected utility given by
ui = ixi   ti (i 2 N ) ;
where xi 2 [0; 1] is the probability that country i receives the loan to be allocated, i
is country is valuation of the loan, and ti 2 [0; 1] is the expected political payment.9 For
simplicity we take the US valuation of the IMF loan to be zero, and this is common knowledge
among countries. In contrast, i 2

; 
    [0; 1] is private information. We take the is
to be identically and independently distributed according to the distribution function F ();
9We restrict attention to ti 2 [0; 1] since in equilibrium political payments are always nonnegative. Al-
ternatively, we could have used ti 2 [ 1; 1] and ui = ixi   jtij :
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which is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable with density f() and bounded below by
a strictly positive number. Finally, the problem is assumed to be regular.10
It follows that in order to maximize its overall political inuence, the US has to design
a loan allocation mechanism that maximizes
PN
i=1 ti, taking into account the constraints on
the size of political payments that individual countries face.11
2.2 The optimal Bayesian mechanism
In deriving the optimal mechanism, two simplifying steps are useful. First, we invoke the
revelation principle (Myerson, 1981), and secondly, we show that the constraints on political
payments imply that attention can be restricted to all-pay mechanisms. The revelation
principle gives that the US can restrict attention to feasible direct revelation mechanisms,
where feasibility refers to constraints on individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and
resources (i.e. constraints on the xis).
A direct mechanism is summarized by the functions


(xi (i;  i)) ; tWi (i;  i) ; t
L
i (i;  i)

i2N
where tWi (i;  i) is the political payment by country i if it gets the loan and t
L
i (i;  i) is
the payment when it does not get the loan. The US solves for the optimal feasible direct
revelation mechanism:
max
(xi();tWi ();tLi ())
E
"X
i2N
 
xi (i;  i) tWi (i;  i) + (1  xi (i;  i)) tLi (i;  i)
#
(1)
10The problem is regular if the virtual valuation  () =    (1   F ())=f() is increasing in  (Krishna,
2002).
11Our framework could be further developed by taking into account the fact that countries, which are
close to the US in terms of bliss points, could be at risk of moving further away from the US position if an
IMF arrangement does not materialize (by a change in government, say). We leave this added complication
for future research.
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subject to
E i

xi (i;  i)
 
i   tWi (i;  i)
  (1  xi (i;  i)) tLi (i;  i) 
E i

xi(
0
i;  i)
 
i   tWi (0i;  i)
  (1  xi(0i;  i)) tLi (0i;  i)
(8i 2 N ; 8(i; 0i) 2 2); (2)
E i

xi (i;  i)
 
i   tWi (i;  i)
  (1  xi (i;  i)) tLi (i;  i)  0
(8i 2 N ; 8i 2 ); (3)
xi ()  0 (8i 2 N ; 8 2 N) and
X
i2N
xi ()  1
 8 2 N ; (4)
max

tWi () ; t
L
i ()
	  wi  8i 2 N ;8 2 N ; (5)
where (2) are the incentive compatibility constraints; (3) the individual rationality con-
straints; (4) the resource constraints; and (5) the constraints on political payments.
Turning now to the second simplifying step, lemma 1 below states that in the presence
of observable constraints on political payments, wi = 1   bi (equivalently, observable bliss
points bi); attention can always without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) be restricted to all-pay
mechanisms where countries submit non-refundable political payments.12
Lemma 1 When countries face publicly observed bliss points, bi; attention can always w.l.o.g.
be restricted to all-pay mechanisms in which tWi (i;  i) = t
L
i (i;  i) = ti(i) for i 2 N : In
fact, all-pay mechanisms weakly revenue dominate any other mechanism.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
12La¤ont and Roberts (1996) also rely on this second step in their paper. They do not, however, provide
a formal proof. The proof of lemma 1 partly relies on arguments in Maskin (2000).
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Using lemma 1, the problem of the US, (1) to (5), can be simplied. To see this, note
that by lemma 1, country is political payment function is independent of whether country
i receives the loan or not, and independent of the other country types, but dependent upon
country is own type. That is, a country makes a non-refundable political payment, which
depends only on its own type. We obtain
max
xi();ti()
E
X
i2N
ti (i) (6)
subject to
E i [xi (i;  i)] i   ti (i)  E i [xi(0i;  i)]i   ti(0i) (8i 2 N ; 8(i; 0i) 2 2); (7)
E i [xi (i;  i)] i   ti (i)  0 (8i 2 N and 8i 2 ); (8)
xi ()  0 (8i 2 N and 8 2 N) and
X
i2N
xi ()  1
 8 2 N ; (9)
ti (i)  wi; (8i 2 N ;8i 2 ) : (10)
Krishna (2002) denes a standard auction as a mechanism which allocates the object to
the bidder making the highest o¤er. The next two propositions provide restrictions on the
parameter space, b1 bN ; which ensures that the solution to the problem (6) to (10)
is a standard auction.
Proposition 2 When all N countries have bliss points su¢ ciently far away from the US
bliss point, i.e. when max bi  1   ; the optimal mechanism is a standard all-pay auction
in which the loan is allocated to the country making the highest political payment.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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When max bi > 1    (or equivalently, minwi < ); the problem is more complicated.
However, La¤ont and Robert (1996) have solved (6)-(10) analytically in the symmetric case
(bi = bj = b).
Proposition 3 When all N countries have identical bliss points, i.e. when bi = bj = b
for all i; j 2 N , the optimal mechanism is a standard all-pay auction in which the loan is
allocated to the country making the highest political payment.
Proof. Follows from La¤ont and Robert (1996).
Consequently, when max bi  1    and/or bi = bj = b; the optimal way for the US to
allocate IMF loans is through a standard all-pay auction. Countries submit non-refundable
political payments and the country with the highest payment receives the loan.
Turning to the asymmetric case in the unrestricted parameter space, no analytical solu-
tion is available.13 We therefore proceed to solve numerically the asymmetric problem in the
simple two-country case where types are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution.
2.2.1 A numerical solution
Let Pr(i = ) =  and Pr(i = ) = 1  ; where 0 <  < . The problem (6)-(10) can now
be written as a maximization problem for i = 1; 2 in xi(1; 2) for all (1; 2) 2

; 
	; 	 ;
and ti (i) for all i 2

; 
	
(see Appendix A.2).
Before proceeding to the solution, we make the following denition: A mechanism is
an auction-type mechanism if the country making the highest political payment stands the
highest probability of receiving the loan. That is,
13When bi = bj = b; the analysis is complicated, but manageable (La¤ont and Robert, 1996), since
symmetry of the strategies can be imposed. Clearly, this is not possible when bi 6= bj : Without symmetry
we face a highly complex control problem.
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Denition 4 The mechanism hxi (1; 2) ; ti (i)ii2f1;2g is an auction-type mechanism if
(ti(i)  tj(j))  (xi (1; 2)  xj (1; 2))  0
for all i; j 2 f1; 2g and for all (1; 2) 2 2:
Clearly, a standard auction (including the standard all-pay auction), in which the bidder
making the highest bid wins, satises denition 4.
Fig. 2 illustrates an optimal all-pay auction-type mechanism. First, it follows immedi-
ately from eyeballing the gure that denition 4 is satised. Second, the constraint on polit-
ical payments, w1 = 0:3; is always binding for a high-type country 1 when  2 (0:438; 0:570).
Country 2 on the other hand does not face a de facto constraint on political payments, since
country 2 will never pay more than  = w2: However, a high-type country 2 does pay w2
when  2 (0:438; 0:570) : Finally, the optimal mechanism does not allocate the loan to a
low-type country 2 and a low-type country 1 when v  0:429 and   0:572; respectively.
In these cases, political payments from low types are zero.
 Insert Fig. 2 here 
Fig. 2: The optimal mechanism with  = 0:7;  = 0:3; w1 = 0:3; w2 = 0:7
2.3 A testable hypothesis
Appendix A.3 reports results from optimizations on 28,000 parameter combinations. We
nd that in over 97% of the cases, an all-pay auction-type mechanism is optimal. Moreover,
when the conditions in proposition 2 and 3 are met, a standard all-pay auction is always
optimal. In all these cases, it is optimal for the US to allocate IMF loans through an all-pay
auction-type mechanism. The country that makes the highest political payment stands the
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highest probability of receiving the IMF loan. This is an intuitive result: if the US wants
to maximize its overall political inuence on IMF member countries, it will reward large
political concessions with IMF loans more frequently. This is our testable hypothesis.14
It should be noted that our hypothesis is di¤erent from the political proximity hypothesis
found in Thacker (1999). In our model, proximity with the US foreign policy stand is not
necessarily positively correlated with the probability of getting an IMF loan. The following
example provides an illustration hereof.
Example 5 Consider the case where  = 0:3;  = 0:7; w1 = 0:3, w2 = 0:7: This is the
scenario in Fig. 2 above. Let  = 0:8 and let both countries be high types. Inspection of
Fig. 2 shows that x2
 
; 

= 0:762 > x1
 
; 

= 0:238 and t2
 


= 0:567 > t1
 


= 0:273:
Using ti = pi   bi and bi = 1   wi; we obtain p1 = 0:973 > p2 = 0:867: Hence, country 1 is
voting more in accordance with the US than country 2, but the former stands a lower chance
of receiving the loan.
If, however, bliss points (i.e. true political preferences) are taken into account, we should
expect a positive correlation between political payments (i.e. political concessions) and the
probability of getting an IMF loan.
Related, Example 5 draws attention to the key point that countries with higher bliss
points will, ceteris paribus, take positions closer to the US. This has implications for the
empirical analysis in that it introduces an endogeneity problem if we fail to account for bliss
points; a point to which we will return in Section 3.1.1 below.
14On a practical level, the hypothesis that loans are allocated through an (implicit) all-pay auction-type
mechanism is appealing, because it is a simple implementable mechanism. In contrast, a mechanism which
is not of the auction type would be di¢ cult to implement and thus violate Wilsons simplicity doctrine (see
Krishna, 2002).
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3 Empirical Analysis
We will test our model in two steps. In the rst step we rely on the same dataset and the same
empirical baseline specication as in Thacker (1999).15 This renders a direct comparison
between the movement hypothesis and our political-concession hypothesis possible. In the
second step, we extend the Thacker data from 1995-2000 and include more countries and
more loan types. The Mexican bailout in 1995 was the harbinger of a series of large IMF
bailouts; it therefore makes sense to analyze this period and the 1985-1994 period covered
by Thacker separately.
3.1 Testing the model using Thackers data
According to Bird and Rowlands (2001, p. 252), Thackers paper provides the best example
to date of integrating political and economic variables into the analysis of Fund lending.
The Thacker dataset consists of annual observations from 83 developing countries during
the period 1985 to 1994. The dependent variable is binary and takes a value of 1 for
a given country year if the country signed an IMF Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) or an
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) during the calendar year, zero otherwise.16 Explanatory
variables include standard macroeconomic factors, which are expected to a¤ect both the
demand for and the supply of IMF loans.
Thacker introduces in addition two political variables in order to capture US inuence
on IMF lending. The rst, kvotei;t 2; is a proxy for the political proximity between the
sample country and the US on important foreign policy matters (corresponding to pi in our
theoretical model).17 More specically, kvotei;t 2 is measured by the degree of coincidence
15Strom C. Thacker has made his dataset publicly available at http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/data.html.
16SBA and EFF loans often cover several years, but only the rst year is recorded in the dependent
variable. Note also that while the IMF uses a variety of instruments in supporting member countries, SBA
and EFF are the main IMF arrangements when it comes to short term balance of payments support.
17Subscript i refers to country and subscript t to year.
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between the votes of the sample country and the US in the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) on issues, which the US Department of State denes as key votes. These votes are
listed in the annual US Department of State publication Report to Congress on Voting
Practices in the United Nations.18 The report from 1985 notes that:
[the] only votes that can legitimately be read as a measure of support for
the United States are those which we identied as important to us, and on which
we lobbied other nations(quoted in Thacker, 1999 p. 53).
Moreover, the report from 1997 states that:
[...] a countrys behavior at the UN is always relevant to its bilateral rela-
tionship with the United States, a point the Secretary of State regularly makes
in letters of instruction to new U.S. ambassadors. This is also why copies of this
report are presented to UN member foreign ministries throughout the world, and
to observer missions in New York. The Security Council and the General Assem-
bly are arguably the most important international bodies in the world, dealing
as they do with such vital issues as threats to peace and security, disarmament,
development, humanitarian relief, human rights, the environment and narcotics
- all of which can and do directly a¤ect major U.S. interest.(p. 6).19
The proxy kvotei;t 2 is calculated as a number between 0 and 1; where ascending values
indicate higher degrees of alignment with the US.20
18The report is addressed to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and it is signed by the Secretary of State. Ultimately then, it is the Secretary of State who endorses the
identication of key votes.
19As an example, key votes in 1993 inter alia cover issues concerning the non-compliance of Iraq and North
Korea with safeguards agreement on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; the US trade embargo
of Cuba; a call for an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights; and Israeli nuclear armament.
20Thacker assigned a value of 1 to votes in agreement with the US; whereas votes in disagreement with
the US were given 0 value. Abstentions and absences by the sample country were included as 0:5: The
justication for assigning 0:5 to nonvotes is that they can be interpreted as neutral votes.
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Thackers second political variable,mkvotei;t 1; captures political movement. It is dened
as mkvotei;t 1 = kvotei;t 1   kvotei;t 2 and it measures the change in sample country is
political proximity with the US from year t   2 to year t   1. The variable belongs to the
interval [ 1; 1] ; where a positive value reects that the sample country has moved towards
the US position.
3.1.1 Dening a proxy-variable
According to our theoretical model, omitting bliss points could result in misspecication,
which may have serious consequences for statistical inference. To see this, recall that political
concessions, ti, are dened as ti = pi   bi: Including only pi in an empirical model may well
lead to endogeneity bias (unless explicitly addressed) since the omitted bis will be captured
by the error term, vi. Countries with higher bliss points will, ceteris paribus, take positions
closer to the US, implying that the error term, vi; will be correlated with actual positions,
pi: That is, cov(pi; bi) > 0 implies that cov(pi; vi) > 0.
One way to correct for endogeneity caused by unobserved heterogeneity is to rely on a
proxy-variable approach; another way is to employ a xed-e¤ects estimator. In this section
we take the former approach, but will have more to say on the latter in Section 3.1.3.
Turning to the construction of a bliss-point proxy, note that key votes only constitute a
small part of all UNGA resolutions; the bulk of all resolutions is not identied as important
by the US State Department. In 1991, which is fairly representative of the sample years,
there were 88 plenary votes (74 on resolutions, 10 on separate paragraphs, two on decisions,
and two on motions); only 12 of these plenary votes were identied as key votes. On the 76
non-key votes, countries are in our view likely to vote in accordance with their true political
preferences since the US is not exercising pressure. The majority of UNGA votes thus provide
information on countriesbliss points.
We employ a spatial measure, Si;t; proposed by Signorino and Ritter (1999), to project
15
the UNGA votes into a single index measure. Gartzke and Jo (2002) have undertaken the
considerable task of compiling Si;t from all votes in the UNGA, and they have made their
computations publicly available.21 The Gartzke-Jo computations have subsequently been
used in published work related to the present paper by Neumayer (2003) and Stone (2004)
to proxy countriesforeign-policy preferences. Hence, public availability and peer acceptance
are two desirable features of Si;t.
Turning to the specics of the index measure, Si;t is computed according to Si;t =
1   PK(t)k=1 wk;t vUSk;t   vik;t ; where vk;t 2 f1 (= "no") ; 2 (= "abstain") ; 3 (= "yes")g is the
position taken by a country on vote k in year t in the UNGA, K(t) is the number of votes in
year t; and wk;t = 1K(t) is the weight attached to vote k in year t (all votes in a given year are
thus weighted equally).22 We proxy bliss points by blissi;t = 12 (1 + Si;t) : By construction,
Si;t lies in the [ 1; 1] interval; we have used the normalization to ensure that blissi;t 2 [0; 1]
Consequently, we dene a new variable, bid; as
bidi;t 1 =   kvotei;t 1 + (1  )  kvotei;t 2   blissi;t 2
=  mkvotei;t 1 + (kvotet 2   blissi;t 2) ;  2 [0; 1] ; (11)
corresponding to t = p   b in the theoretical model. Some comments on the lag structure
are in order. First, voting in the UNGA takes place from September to December. Hence,
all IMF loans pertaining to the rst two thirds of year t can only rely on voting in year
t 1: Second, the report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations, compiling
voting behavior for year t  1; is released annually on 31 March in year t: For some part of
year t then, only year t   2 voting patterns have been compiled. Finally, as stressed in the
1997 version of the report to Congress, in recent years (1991 onwards) the US has successfully
21Data can be downloaded from www.columbia.edu/~eg589/datasets.htm.
22In the working paper version of the present paper we provide an alternative bliss-point proxy based only
on non-key UNGA votes. As demonstrated therein, all results presented in this section carry through. This
is not surprising, since the bulk of UNGA votes are non-key votes (see main text).
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accomplished that some voting issues will only be considered biannually in the UNGA. These
observations suggest the inclusion of the rst and second lag of key votes in (11). Since the
value of  is unknown, we estimate it. From (11) we retrieve  by testing restrictions on the
estimated coe¢ cients on mkvotei;t 1 and (kvotei;t 2   blissi;t 2) ; respectively.23
Di¤erent political variables. At this stage it is useful to be completely clear about
the political variables used in the empirical literature and the political payment variable,
pi;t   bi;t; identied in our theoretical model. Thacker (1999) relies on UNGA key votes to
calculate political proximity, pi;t 1; and the change herein (i.e. movement), pi;t pi;t 1: Both
Barro and Lee (2002), Neumayer (2003), Oatley and Yackee (2000) and Stone (2004) all use
(both key and non-key) UNGA votes in computing their political variable. The terminology
di¤ers widely across these studies; they use respectively proximity, similarity, alignment and
foreign-policy preferences. As argued above (and by Stone, 2004), relying on all UNGA
votes is a measure of policy preferences; i.e. is a proxy for bliss points, bi;t: If our model is
an adequate description of reality, both pi;t and bi;t should be included; and their di¤erence
is an indicator of political payment.
3.1.2 Results
Turning to estimations, results from the pooled logit model applied by Thacker (1999) are
reported in Table 1. We only report results for the political variables; since we only in-
clude/remove political variables; results for the economic conditioning variables are (qualita-
tively) identical to those reported in Thacker. In all estimations, the dependent loan variable
is measured in period t, whereas explanatory economic variables are lagged by one period,
i.e. are measured in period t  1.
23Our results are not sensitive to how we include the bliss-point proxy. In fact, all our results hold with
bliss points being proxied by the simple average blissi;t =
Pt
=t0
Si;= (t  (t0   1)) ; where t runs from
t0 = 1985 to T = 1994.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
kvotei;t 2 1.25 -0.93
(1.74)* (1.43)
kvotei;t 1 2.41
(3.31)***
mkvotei;t 1 2.76 1.18
(3.47)*** (1.48)
bidi;t 1 2.38 2.27 1.70 2.80
(3.27)*** (2.51)** (1.97)** (3.58)***
blissi;t 1 -3.34
(1.71)*
# obs. 746 746 746 746 746 746
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17
Table 1. Pooled logit estimations from Thackers baseline model. Notes: *, ** and *** denote
signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The model is dynamically complete so
standard inference is valid (t-values in parentheses). The dependent variable is binary (= 1 for a
country year if the country received a SBA or an EFF loan during a calendar year). Economic
conditioning variables include overall balance of payments, per capita overall balance of payments,
current account balance, per capita debt, debt to GNP, interest payments to GNP, reserves to
GNP, per capita GNP, previous cancellations of IMF programs, US exports, US FDI and rst
di¤erences of these variables. All economic conditioning variables are lagged one period. Column
(3) is estimated with time dummies; these are jointly insignicant. All economic data and key
vote data are taken from Thacker (1999); that paper should be consulted for detailed information
on data and denitions of the variables. Bliss points are calculated using data downloaded from
www.columbia.edu/~eg589/datasets.htm.
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The rst column, denoted (1), is the original baseline model proposed by Thacker. Prox-
imity, kvotei;t 1; is marginally signicant whereas movement, mkvotei;t 1, is signicant at
one percent. In column (2) we have estimated the model with the restriction  = 1 in (11)
imposed; we cannot reject this restriction at any signicance level below 0.14. Column (2)
is in fact the correct test of our theoretical model: We have a model based on optimizing
behavior and column (2) demonstrates that the predictions of the model, i.e. that the prob-
ability of receiving an IMF loan is increasing in the amount of political payments, cannot
be rejected by the data.24 Column (3) is column (2) with time dummies; these are jointly
insignicant.25
Columns (4) and (5) demonstrate that movement, mkvotei;t 1; and proximity, kvotei;t 2;
are irrelevant once bidi;t 1 is accounted for. One way to interpret these columns is as fol-
lows: We are trying to statistically choose between two nonnested models (Gourieroux and
Monfort, 1994). Columns (4) and (5) are supermodelsthat articially nest two competing
models; one with bidi;t 1 (our model) and mkvotei;t 1 (column (4)) and one with bidi;t 1 and
kvotei;t 2 (column (5)). In both columns, bidi;t 1 dominates. Our political variable bidi;t 1
is thus statistically preferred to mkvotei;t 1 and kvotei;t 2 in the sense that the last two turn
insignicant, whereas bidi;t 1 is signicant at ve and one percent, respectively. This allows
us to statistically choose bidi;t 1 over mkvotei;t 1 and kvotei;t 2.
Column (6) reveals that it is not kvotei;t 1 that drives our results since blissi;t 2 comes
with a statistically signicant negative sign.26 Hence, a higher value of blissi;t 2, i.e. a tighter
constraint on political payments, lowers the probability of receiving a loan. Intuitively, this
is a sensible result since countries with high bliss points have a binding bidding constraint
24Simply using  = 12 does not change this conclusion.
25In column (2), the marginal e¤ect on the loan probability of a marginal increase in bid (estimated at
mean values of the independent variables) is 0.23 (the probability of an IMF loan at mean values is 0.11 and
the mean bid is 0.35). The quasi-elasticity at mean values is 0.08. Hence, an increase at mean values of one
percent in bid leads to an increase in the loan probability of 0.08 percentage point (from 11% to 11.08%).
26A Wald test cannot reject the restriction that the coe¢ cients on kvotei;t 1 and blissi;t 1 sum to zero at
any signicance level below 0:59:
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more often. It would also be the prediction of the theoretical model in the two-country case
when the countries have bliss points that are su¢ ciently far apart.
3.1.3 Fixed-e¤ects approach
As mentioned above, another valid estimation approach is to rely on a xed-e¤ects panel
estimator in order to eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity (unobserved bliss points). We
have experimented with this (not reported) and results are fully consistent with our story.
Briey, instead of relying on a dynamically complete logit model as above (see Wooldridge,
2002 p. 483 for dynamic completeness), we have estimated a parsimonious conditional xed-
e¤ects logit. As emphasized by Wooldridge (2002 p. 409), including su¢ cient lags in order
to induce dynamic completeness is not necessarily desirable when unobserved heterogeneity
is causing the serial correlation in the scores across time. We expect this to be the case
when bliss points are omitted, and a Hausman test conrms the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity. In the conditional xed-e¤ects logit kvotei;t 1 is always signicant, which is
in line with bidi;t 1 being the relevant political variable.
3.1.4 Country episodes
Apart from the econometric analysis looking at a few country episodes is instructive. Only
two countries received six IMF loans over the period 1985-1994: Jamaica and Ecuador;
all other countries received fewer loans. Moreover, both Jamaica and Ecuador gave large
political concessions to the US in the UNGA, with cumulative bids above the 75th percentile.
Jamaica was forced by circumstances to approach the US. In particular, Michael Manley
led the country towards democratic socialism (nationalizing industry and denouncing US
imperialism) in the 1970s, causing capital ight and hyperination. The US was hostile
to the socialist path Jamaica was embarking on; and when Manley became too friendly
with Fidel Castro, rumors emerged that the CIA planned to topple him. The economy
20
went into sharp decline. In 1980, Edward Seaga of the Jamaican Labor party won the
election and inherited disarray. Seaga severed ties with Cuba and courted Reagans USA.
Interestingly, this happened at a time when Congress passed Public Laws 98-164 and 99-
190, which authorized the US President to withhold aid to countries that regularly cast votes
against US positions in the UN (Wang, 1999). In 1989, a reinventedManley returned to
power, this time leading a much more moderate government. During Manleys second tenure
(1989-1992),27 Jamaica received three IMF loans (in 1990, 1991 and 1992).
Twenty-three countries never received any IMF loans. Among these, Yemen and Fiji
stand out: the former gave the smallest political concession among all sample countries; the
latter gave the highest. Fiji does not seem to t the model well.28 Other countries, e.g.
Colombia, also gave large political concessions without receiving any IMF loans. For some
of these countries, however, the non-t is more apparent than real. Colombia, for instance,
has received large amounts of US military aid to assist the Colombian government in the
battle against drug trade (or the guerrillas, since these are intimately involved with narcotics
tra¢ cking). The US assistance goes back to the rst Bush administration (1989-93) and its
Andean Strategy.
3.2 Results from the post-1994 period
In this section we test our hypothesis in a panel covering the period 1995 to 2000. Our dataset
includes 177 IMF member countries, but our unbalanced estimation panel only includes 102
countries (539 country years and 62 loan spells). There are two reasons for this: First, we
discarded 24 of the (presently) 30 OECD member countries; we have included Hungary,
27Manley resigned in 1992, citing health reasons.
28Israel, a staunch ally of the US and not part of the Thacker sample, did not receive any SBA or EFF
IMF loans during the sample period. Israel had a bliss point of 0.91 in 1994, which e¤ectively means that
Israel had little to o¤er in terms of political concessions. In fact Israel only signed an IMF agreement in
1974, 1975 and 1976, which is well in accord with our theoretical model. Nevertheless,the US has given
large amounts of strategic bilateral aid and military support to Israel over the years, without receiving any
political concessions.
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Korea, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic and Turkey.29 Including all OECD countries simply
inates the t of the empirical model. The reason is that the excluded OECD countries
make small political concessions to the US and never receive IMF loans. Second, data
availability caused another 51 countries to drop out of the panel.30 Following Bird and
Rowlands (2001), we have addressed the problem that some countries were not eligible to
sign an IMF agreement because of arrears to the Fund by simply including all countries.
The argument is that the IMF could solve the arrears problem if it so wished by extending
a new agreement.
We have estimated an empirical model along the lines of the baseline model reported in
Thacker (1999). The model ts the data very well and underscores the continuity of the core
argument pursued in this paper. Results are reported in Table 2. We will not discuss the
economic conditioning variables in any detail (see Thacker, 1999). Nevertheless, a few issues
deserve a brief comment. First, the signs of all variables that are statistically signicant in
Thackers baseline model (see column 1, Table 1 in Thacker, 1999) and included in Table 2
(i.e., GNP per capita, balance of payments, debt to GNP, debt per capita, interest payments
to GNP, both level and rst di¤erence, and reserves to debt) are preserved in Table 2. Second,
among these economic variables, we also nd that the balance of payments, debt to GNP
and interest payments to GNP are statistically signicant. Third, as in Thacker, we nd a
negative and statistically signicant sign associated with the debt to GNP variable. Note,
however, that this is counterbalanced by a positive and statistically signicant sign on the
absolute level of debt. Fourth, the change in the current account variable has an unexpected
positive and statistically signicant sign; this is, however, counterbalanced by the change in
the current account to GNP variable, which is negative and statistically signicant. Finally,
29Korea, however, drops out because the World Development Indicators (2004) provide no information
on public and publicly guaranteed debt (the dt_dod_dppg_cd series) for Korea. However, none of the
results reported below change if we use long-term debt outstanding and disbursed from Global Development
Finance (2003) (the dt.dod.dlxf.cd series) for Korea instead.
30See Appendix A.4 for a list of countries included.
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the Asian crisis dummy has a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on the probability
of an IMF loan: large loans to a few hard hit countries squeezed IMF liquidity.
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(1) (2) (3)
coe¢ cient quasi elasticity
GNP per capita -0.018
(0:73)
-0.019
(0:72)
Balance of payments (BoP) -0.012
(3:62)
-0.001 -0.010
(2:85)
(BoP) -0.010
(2:12)
-1.710-4 -0.010
(1:89)
BoP per capita 0.164
(1:00)
0.110
(0:63)
(BoP per capita) 0.069
(0:38)
0.048
(0:25)
Current account 0.002
(0:50)
0.001
(0:28)
(Current account) 0.013
(2:93)
0.001 0.014
(3:11)
Current account/GNP -0.565
(0:19)
0.569
(0:17)
(Current account/GNP) -6.661
(2:04)
-0.001 -6.213
(1:83)
Debt 0.001
(2:29)
0.008 0.002
(2:13)
(debt) 0.007
(0:62)
0.007
(0:66)
Debt/GNP -2.968
(2:91)
-0.076 -3.562
(2:68)
(debt/GNP) 1.944
(0:75)
1.913
(0:78)
Debt per capita 0.073
(1:52)
0.064
(1:31)
(Debt per capita) -0.114
(0:81)
-0.108
(0:80)
Interest payments/GNP 0.271
(1:73)
0.024 0.284
(1:84)
(Interest payments/GNP) 0.505
(1:53)
0.489
(1:53)
Reserves/debt -0.001
(0:41)
-0.001
(0:33)
(Reserves/debt) -0.002
(0:70)
-0.002
(0:76)
24
Table continued
(1) (2) (3)
coe¢ cient quasi elasticity
kvotei;t 2 4.926
(3:47)
bidi;t 1 4.386
(3:47)
0.028
blissi;t 2 -2.970
(1:91)
Asian crisis dummy -1.706
(2:44)
-0.013 -1.655
(2:47)
Constant -2.533
(3:48)
-3.570
(3:35)
Number of observations 539 539
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.24
Correctly predicted (%) 89.42 88.87
Table 2. Logit Estimations (1995-2000). Notes: *, ** and *** denote signicance at the 10, 5, and
1 percent level, respectively (t-statistics robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and arbitrary serial
correlation across time in parentheses). The dependent variable is binary (= 1 for a country year
if the country signed a SBA or an EFF loan agreement during the calendar year). All economic
conditioning variables are lagged one period. Economic level variables are in millions of 1999 USD;
per capita economic variables are in 1999 USD. Economic data are taken from IMF Annual Report
(various years), IMF International Financial Statistics (2002) and World Development Indicators
(2004). The GDP deator is from OECD International Development Statistics (2003). Bliss points
are calculated using data downloaded from www.columbia.edu/~eg589/datasets.htm (values for
1997 and 1998 are extrapolated from 1996). Key votes are obtained from the annual report to
Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations (various years) prepared by the United
States Department of State.
Column (1) estimates bidi;t 1 as described by equation (11) with the restriction  = 0
imposed. A Wald test cannot reject this restriction at any signicance level below 0.21.
Column (1) is the correct test of our hypothesis. Importantly, we cannot reject our model
at one percent in this updated dataset.31
31Results are robust with respect to the choice of : For instance, bidi;t 1 retains signicance at one
percent with  = 12 and at ten percent with  =
9
10 :
25
Column (2) reports quasi elasticities at mean values (indicating the percentage point
change of the probability upon a 1% increase in an independent variable) for the statistically
signicant variables. The probability of an IMF loan at mean values is 4.473% and the
mean value of bidi;t 1 is 0.147. Hence, a increase in bidi;t 1 from 0.147 to 0.148 will roughly
increase the probability of an IMF loan with 0.028 percentage point (from 4.473% to 4.501%),
implying economic signicance. The following example shows economic signicance in terms
of a one-key vote change in voting behavior:
Example 6 Consider a situation with 10 key votes; and consider a country with a bliss point
of 0:45 (roughly the sample average), which votes with the US on 6 key votes and abstain on
the rest. The bid is then 0:6  0:45 = 0:15. If the country now changes voting behavior and
chooses to vote with the US on 7 key votes, it increases the bid to 0:7   0:45 = 0:25. This
translates into an increase in the probability of an IMF loan of roughly 1:87 percentage point
(at mean values).
Column (3) demonstrates that blissi;t 2 is marginally signicant with a negative sign,
which is in full accord with column (6) in Table 1. That is, a higher bliss point implies
that the bidding constraintwill bind more often. Moreover, a Wald test cannot reject the
restriction that the coe¢ cients on kvotei;t 2 and blissi;t 2 sum to zero at any signicance
level below 0:15 percent.
3.2.1 Other issues (including robustness)
Loan size. Our theoretical model makes no predictions regarding the size of the loan;
it only makes predictions regarding the probability of receiving an IMF loan. We have,
however, experimented with a tobit model. It turns out that a tobit model is inappropriate
in the present context. A tobit model forces the probability of a loan to be governed by
the same mechanism that governs the size of a loan. Wooldridge (2003) outlines a simple
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(informal) test of this assumption; a tobit in the present context fails this test.32 We have
therefore also experimented with a hurdle model (see Wooldridge, 2002), but an e¤ect from
bidi;t 1 to loan size was not found.
Other political variables. We have experimented with other political variables. For
instance, we have included a variable in column (1) (not reported), which measures rich-
country inuence more broadly; it is a DAC weighted version of the Signorino and Ritter
(1999) measure. Each countrys voting similarity with the individual DAC donors is rst
calculated according to the Signorino and Ritter formula. These numbers are then weighted
by the proportion of total DAC aid provided by each of the individual donors so as to obtain
a single measure of DAC-weighted voting similarity. This measure has no explanatory power
when bidi;t 1 is included, while bidi;t 1 retains signicance at one percent. Moreover, the
DAC weighted measure also has no explanatory power when bidi;t 1 is excluded.
We have also estimated column (1) with the inclusion of a variable measuring the sum
of NATO arms exports in the period 1992-1997. This variable has some explanatory power.
It has a statistically signicant e¤ect on the probability of an IMF loan at ten percent; the
quasi elasticity is 0.001.33 The bidi;t 1 variable remains signicant at one percent with a
coe¢ cient of 4:47 and with the exact same quasi elasticity (at mean values) as above, i.e.
0:028. Interestingly, when bidi;t 1 is excluded, the sum of NATO arms exports in the period
1992-1997 looses signicance.
Finally, we have estimated the model with a variable measuring the amount an IMF
member country imports from the G7 countries.34 This variable had no explanatory power.
32One explanation may be that countries with really poor fundamentals are more likely to receive a loan
compared to countries with better fundamentals, but at the same time, conditional on receiving a loan, the
former countries receive smaller loans compared to countries with better fundamentals. The Asian Crisis,
for instance, involved large loans to countries with relatively good fundamentals (Tirole, 2002). This violates
the assumptions behind the tobit model.
33However, it looses signicance when Korea is included.
34These variables were compiled by Eric Neumayer (2003). We thank him for kindly making his data
available.
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Consequently, adding other measures of political inuence does not have any implications
for the signicance (statistical and economic) of the bidi;t 1 variable.
Other IMF loan arrangements. If we, in addition to SBA loans and EFF loans, also in-
clude ESAF loans (not reported), bidi;t 1 retains signicance at one percent with a coe¢ cient
estimate of 2.55.35 However, the overall t of the model drops dramatically: the pseudo R2
becomes 0:08: The reduction in explanatory power hides an interesting observation: With
ESAF loans as the only dependent variable, bidi;t 1 is no longer signicant. The single most
important variable in explaining ESAF lending is GDP per capita. Thus, political factors
do not seem to inuence ESAF lending.
4 Conclusion
IMF lending to developing countries is controversial. Case studies and some econometric
evidence are available, especially on the economic determinants of IMF behavior. Yet much
remains to be learned about how economic and political factors shape IMF decision making.
Also, since formal modelling of the political economy in which this international organization
nds itself is scant, proper interpretation of results from empirical work is not straightfor-
ward.
In this paper, we put forward a stylized model of US inuence on IMF lending. Assuming
that the US wishes to maximize its overall inuence on the policy stance of debtor countries,
we derived an optimal loan allocation mechanism and articulated a testable hypothesis. It
states that the probability of receiving an IMF loan is increasing in political payments,
dened as the di¤erence between a given countrys actual policy stand and its true political
preferences (i.e. its bliss point) measured relative to the US.
35In September 1999, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) replaced the Enhanced Struc-
tural Adjustment facility (ESAF).
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The model highlights that leaving bliss points unaccounted for (which to our knowledge
is the case in previous work) may hide an endogeneity problem. We introduced a bliss-point
proxy and tested our model using two panels. The data support the claim that the US
inuences how the Fund allocates its loans in a manner which is consistent with our model.
In sum, in this paper we put focus on the need to take account of true political prefer-
ences of member countries in their relationship with the US. Moreover, by capturing such
preferences explicitly through a bliss-point proxy, we believe to have strengthened the view
that political factors, in this case US politics, play a decisive role in IMF decision making.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Take any mechanism


(xi (i;  i)) ; tWi (i;  i) ; t
L
i (i;  i)

i2N satisfying (2), (3), (4) and
(5). We take the perspective of country i, noting that the argument is symmetric for other
countries: For any i; dene ti(i) as
ti(i)  E i

xi (i;  i) tWi (i;  i) + (1  xi (i;  i)) tLi (i;  i)

:
We will argue that h(xi (i;  i)) ; ti(i)ii2N is a feasible direct mechanism. This requires that
E i [xi (i;  i)] i   ti(i)  E i [xi (0i;  i)] i   ti(0i); (12)
E i [xi (i;  i)] i   ti(i)  0; (13)
ti(i)  wi; (14)
where wi = 1  bi: Since (12) is equivalent to (2) and (13) is equivalent to (3), (12) and (13)
are satised. Moreover, since tWi (i;  i) and t
L
i (i;  i) satisfy (5), ti(i) satises (14).
Weak dominance of the all-pay mechanism follows immediately from the fact that ti(i)
is a convex combination of tWi (i;  i) and t
L
i (i;  i) : That is, payment constraints bind
less frequently in all-pay mechanisms.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Since max bi  1    , minwi  ; (8) implies that (10) is never violated. The optimal
mechanism is then the solution to the problem (6) to (9), which is solved in Krishna (2002).
Using the fact that valuations are i.i.d., Proposition 5.3 in Krishna gives that an optimal
mechanism is a standard second-price auction. By the revenue equivalence theorem (see
Krishna, Proposition 5.2), the all-pay auction is also an optimal mechanism.
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A.3 Numerical solution
The problem to be solved in Section 2.2.1 is:
max
xi(1;2);ti(i)
t1
 


+ (1  ) t1 () + t2
 


+ (1  ) t2 ()
subject to

 
x1
 
; 

+ (1  )x1
 
; 
  t1      x1  ; + (1  )x1 (; )  t1()

 
x1
 
; 

+ (1  )x1 (; )
  t1 ()    x1  ; + (1  )x1  ;   t1()

 
x2
 
; 

+ (1  )x2
 
; 
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
 
x2
 
; 

+ (1  )x2 (; )
  t2 ()    x2  ; + (1  )x2  ;   t2  

 
x1
 
; 

+ (1  )x1
 
; 
  t1    0

 
x1
 
; 

+ (1  )x1 (; )
  t1 ()  0

 
x2
 
; 

+ (1  )x2
 
; 
  t2    0

 
x2
 
; 

+ (1  )x2 (; )
  t2 ()  0
min

xi
 
; 

; xi
 
; 

; xi
 
; 

; xi (; )
	  0; (for i = 1; 2)
x1 (1; 2) + x2 (1; 2)  1
 
for all (1; 2) 2

; 
	 ; 	
max

ti
 


; ti ()
	  wi; (for i = 1; 2) :
The above mechanism design problem is a linear programming problem, which may have
multiple solutions. In order to explore whether there always exists an optimal auction-type
mechanism satisfying denition 4, we undertook a systematic numerical analysis. For  = 0:3
and  = 0:7 we did numerical optimizations on 28; 000 parameter combinations (w1; w2; v) ;
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where (w1; w2; v) 2 [0; 1]3: Specically, v 2 [0:01; 1] with a grid of 0:01; w1 2 [0:01; w2] with a
grid of 0:01; and w2 2 [0:1; 0:7] with a grid of 0:1: First, we solved the linear program. Second,
we imposed denition 4 as a nonlinear restriction and solved this constrained nonlinear
optimization problem. Third, value functions were compared with an absolute tolerance of
1 10 10: Di¤erences between value functions were within the tolerance band in 97.38 percent
of the cases.36
36We used linprog and fmincon in Matlabs optimization toolbox in the numerical study.
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A.4 Sample countries
Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bo-
livia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Comoros, Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithua-
nia, Macedonia (FYR), Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mex-
ico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sene-
gal, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkmenistan,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam,
Zambia.
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Revision of EER-D-04-00836 
Authors’ response to Referee #1: 
 
Issue 1:  
The referee finds the paper could achieve more, especially if we: (i) bring the data up-to-date; (ii) 
test for other forms of G7 influence; and (iii) try using other dependent variables (loan size and the 
degree of conditionality). The referee would also like to see how political influence over the IMF 
has changed, if at all, in the post-1994 period. The referee urges us to discuss this even if we do not 
bring our empirical analysis up-to-date.  
 
Answer:
(i) We fully agree with the referee that an updating of the dataset is both relevant and of interest. 
The reason for focusing squarely on the Thacker dataset in the first place was to try to avoid the 
objection that our key result is caused by differences in data and/or model specification. To respond 
in an appropriate manner to the referee and at the same time take account of this concern, we retain 
the independent analysis of the Thacker dataset, while providing as well a complete empirical 
analysis of the period 1995 to 2000. Our results are as shown in the new Section 3.2 fully consistent 
between the two periods. Undertaking the suggested additional work has also in our view 
strengthened the paper considerably. 
 
(ii) We have tested as well (see Section 3.2.1) for other forms of G7 influence. In particular, we 
have added a DAC weighted UN voting variable, a variable capturing NATO arms export and a G7 
import variable. All are used by Eric Neumayer (2003). Adding such variables does not alter our 
key result, but we recognize that this additional testing was very useful to put focus on the 
robustness of our findings. 
 
(iii) Concerning the use of other dependent variables such as loan size (raised by both referees) and 
the degree of conditionality, it is important to highlight that our theoretical model is silent on this. 
The theoretical model only addresses the probability of receiving an IMF loan. That being said, we 
have - to respond in a proper way to the referees - tested for loan size as reported in Section 3.2.1. 
This empirical analysis suggests that the mechanism determining the allocation of loans (i.e. who 
gets a loan) is different from the mechanism determining the size of a loan. This means that a tobit 
model cannot be used to analyze loan size. Hence, we have also experimented with a hurdle model, 
but have not been able to detect any link from bid to the size of the loan. Concerning the degree of 
conditionality we now mention a recent paper by Dreher and Jensen (2004) on this issue. 
 
Issue 2:  
The referee would like us to consider whether the exclusion of ESAF loans is likely to make a 
difference to our results. The referee expects the inclusion of ESAF loans to make a difference. 
 
Answer:  
We have estimated a model in which ESAF loans are included. The intuition of the referee is 
absolutely correct. The inclusion of ESAF loans does make a difference. We have therefore 
included a discussion of this in Section 3.2.1. 
 
Issue 3:  
The referee would like us to consider which mechanism the US Dept. of State uses for determining 
key votes. 
Revision Notes
 
Answer:
The report to Congress is addressed to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, and it is signed by the Secretary of State. Ultimately, it is the Secretary of State, 
who endorses the identification of key votes. As such we find it justified to rely on key votes as 
done in our paper. Moreover, we have noted in the revised paper that key votes concern really 
crucial foreign policy issues for the US. In fact, many of the key votes are the same from year to 
year (e.g. the trade embargo of Cuba, Israeli nuclear armament and issues concerning North Korea 
and Iraq). 
 
Issue 4:  
The referee would like us to consider whether other measures of US interests would give similar 
results.  
 
Answer:
We have tested for the influence of other US political interest variables such as US export in 
general and US arms export in particular (both compiled by Eric Neumayer). They have no 
explanatory power neither when used on their own nor when bid is included (while bid is always 
significant at one percent). This suggests that key votes, which is a US political-interest variable 
sanctioned by the US Secretary of State, is indeed a powerful and well-defined core explanatory 
(political) variable. We also note that outgoing US FDI (a variable used by Thacker) has no 
influence neither when used on its own nor when bid is included (while bid is always significant at 
one percent). 
 
In sum, we agree with the excellent and useful comments by the referee and have tried to address 
them in a comprehensive manner. Undertaking the additional work suggested was certainly worth it 
with a view to completing a more comprehensive and satisfactory paper. 
Revision of EER-D-04-00836 
Authors’ response to Referee #2: 
 
Issue 1:  
The referee senses that the importance of political payments is perhaps too much emphasized in the 
paper, and the referee is unsure why only political payment is important but ‘political proximity’ is 
not important at all. The referee suggests that Israel provides a case in point and that the results 
from fixed-effects estimations point in the same direction. The referee urges that we provide a 
careful discussion of this point. Moreover, the referee finds it strange that the sample of the 
regressions excludes Israel as well as all industrial countries.  
  
Answer:  
We agree with the referee that these points needed to be better explained. This we have done in the 
revised version as follows:  
 
First, we have clarified that proximity (as defined by Thacker) does indeed matter, but in 
conjunction with bliss points; and our results strongly suggest that the political payment approach is 
the correct model. In fact, the bid variable is preferred in both the Thacker sample and in the 1995-
2000 sample. Moreover, results from the fixed-effects estimator are fully consistent with this. We 
have a theoretical model saying that if we only include proximity, we leave out a fixed-effect (bliss 
points), which is correlated with proximity. A Hausman test cannot reject the presence of fixed 
effects, and proximity is significant with the correct sign. In addition, we have clarified in Section 
3.1.1 the different concepts of proximity used in the literature. 
 
Second, Israel did not receive any SBA and EFF IMF loans during the Thacker sample years. 
Moreover, it did not receive any loans in the extended sample period from 1995 to 2000. It is true 
that Israel’s bliss point is close to one. In an IMF context, this means that Israel fits our model 
perfectly: low bids – no loans. This same is true for the other industrial countries; they have all 
made low bids and received no loans. As such, if we had included these countries it would simply 
increase the fit of the model; but it would not provide any interesting econometric information. 
Nevertheless, we recognize that the US has given large amounts of strategic bilateral aid and 
military support to Israel over the years, without receiving any political concessions. Israel has 
received lots of US military assistance during the years without giving political concessions; this is 
related to the exceptional role of Israel in the broader Middle Eastern context.  
 
Issue 2:  
The referee would like us to provide a few country episodes to explain the importance of bliss 
points and political concessions. The referee recommends that we shed light on which country 
provided the highest political concessions to the US over time and got IMF loans more frequently?  
 
Answer:  
We fully agree that a discussion of some country episodes is interesting. Moreover, we find the 
referee’s suggestion very useful, and therefore have included discussion of a few country episodes 
in Section 3.1.4 without expanding the size of the paper too much.  
 
Issue 3:  
The referee would like us to explain how the IMF loan variable treats multi-year programs. 
 
Revision Notes
Answer:  
 
We agree that not commenting on this was an omission and have now included a note on this issue 
in Section 3.1. 
 
Issue 4:  
The referee asks whether the empirical model can be extended to explain the size of IMF loans.  
 
Answer:  
Both referees have raised this interesting question. Our theoretical model is silent on this point; it 
only addresses the loan allocation issue. That being said, we have - to respond in a proper way to 
the referees - tested for loan size as reported in Section 3.2.1. This empirical analysis suggests that 
the mechanism determining the allocation of loans (i.e. who gets a loan) is different from the 
mechanism determining the size of a loan. This means that a tobit model cannot be used to analyze 
loan size. Hence, we have also experimented with a hurdle model, but have not been able to detect 
any link from bid to the size of the loan. 
 
In sum, we are most grateful for the pertinent comments by the referee and have tried to address 
them in a comprehensive manner. We believe this has strengthened the paper. 
 
 
